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DALIA ABDELHAMEED
HOW CAN THE DOMESTICATION OF WOMEN 
FACILITATE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR 
PLIGHT IN EGYPT?
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to address an apparent contradiction relative to the condition of women in Egypt. Health and education indicators for women 
have shown continuous progress in past decades. Yet over the same period, 
their lived realities have been marked by a clear deterioration in terms of 
employment prospects, political representation and participation, as well as 
their right to be free from violence in both public and private spheres.
This article sheds light on the causes of this paradox, which lie in the 
emphasis of values connected to the cult of domesticity for women in the 
post-colonial state of Egypt. I will retrace the roots of this domestication, fos-
tered by the State and celebrated by society, to the Nasserist era. These values 
were maintained under the different political regimes that followed, and met 
with an ongoing struggle from feminists and activists who resist these values. 
This paper situates the relatively recent upsurge in sexual violence against 
women in the public sphere as a relection and extension of the gender-based 
violence that takes place in the private sphere. 
It concludes with some prescriptive observations on how to resist that cult 
of domesticity in our work and activism.
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This paper addresses the question of discrepancies between the enhancement 
of women’s educational indicators, life expectancy and fertility rates on one 
hand, and the shamefully low percentages of female employment and politi-
cal representation in Egypt, on the other hand. I will emphasize the role of 
domesticity and unequal relationships in the private sphere, and retrace the 
roots of these phenomena and their past evolution. The paper ends with the 
conclusion that the struggle for women’s rights in Egypt must address the “cult 
of domesticity” attached to women, if we hope to achieve a real and funda-
mental change in gender power dynamics. 
THE GENDER PARADOX
In 2004, the World Bank issued a report entitled “Gender and Development in 
Middle East and North Africa: Women in the Public Sphere.” It discussed a 
peculiar phenomenon related to this region: great advances in the indicators 
related to women’s education, fertility and life expectancy are coupled with 
unequal participation of women in the labor force and their even lower repre-
sentation on the political level. The report mentioned, for example, that 
women’s average number of years of schooling in the Middle East and North 
Africa increased from 0.5 in 1960 to 4.5 in 1999. Low female participation in 
the labor market was described as a missed opportunity for these countries; the 
report called this phenomenon “the gender paradox”. The social and eco-
nomic reasons cited as reasons for this phenomenon were the centrality of the 
family, the imagined role of men as breadwinners, the modesty imposed on 
women and more importantly, the imbalance between men and women in the 
private sphere. 1 The last reason is a key factor in understanding this contradic-
tion in women’s conditions in the MENA region, and more speciically in 
Egypt; it remains relevant after the issuing of this report. It is not a novel devel-
opment and the next section will reveal how over the years, this inequality has 
not only been rooted in the social level, but also institutionalized by the State. 2 
1. World Bank, 2004, p. 1, 6, 28, 55, 94, 95.
2. I use female labor force participation as a manifestation of women’s role in public 
life for several reasons. First, women are involved in the informal economy but this 
should not be equated with formal participation in the labor force, due to the problems 
of the precarity of informal labor in Egypt and of extremely low wages earned by women 
in particular, in this ield. Second, formal labor participation necessarily requires female 
presence and activity in the public sphere, whereas informal sector work may be done 
within the domestic sphere; this is crucial if we are to understand women’s presence in 
the public sphere and account for it. Finally, female labor participation is a relection of 
female advancement into decision-making positions, and consequently, reaching the 
formulation and designing of laws and policies that inluence women’s lives.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE PRE- AND POST-NASSERITE ERAS
The discourse of early male champions of women’s rights in the beginning of 
the twentieth century, such as Qasem Amin, was centered on advocating for 
women’s education in order to make them better mothers. This domestic 
shadow has always haunted women’s struggles; scholars have consistently 
highlighted the failure of early Egyptian feminists – and other feminists in the 
region – to win the battles of the private sphere. Even in the late twentieth 
century, when intellectual production of feminist knowledge was booming 
and accelerating through women’s journals and magazines, and the impor-
tance of women’s education and work was being stressed, there were also 
articles on how women should clean their houses, and be good wives and 
mothers. 3 No matter what gains they were making, whether it was the right to 
education, the right to vote or the right to participate in public life, all the 
issues related to the private sphere remained untouched and harder to address. 
Changing personal status laws, and asserting rights to abortion and bodily 
autonomy were a taboo. 
During the Nasserite era, the State introduced a very perplexing discourse 
toward women. On the one hand, the regime wanted to depict women as 
symbols of modernity; the State expanded female education, women gained 
the right to vote and to run for public ofice, and they participated heavily in 
the labor force. The discourse of championing women was omnipresent, and 
they were incorporated in the national postcolonial discourse as political sub-
jects. Yet on the other hand, the State continued to use the cultural discourse 
of women and the private sphere. To solve the population problem, the State 
used a modernist discourse to publicize family planning campaigns and to 
convince people to opt for smaller families, but when it came to personal sta-
tus law, which is based on Islamic law, feminists failed miserably to effect 
change. According to Bier, 4 this failure was not due to the discourse the femi-
nist movement then used, but to the “normative gender policy” adopted by 
the State, especially in the realm of the family.
Here, Bier invokes a very important point about the separation between 
secular and religious/Islamic discourses dealing with women’s issues. What 
should be stressed here is how different discourses have been used and 
enforced to fulill the State’s and/or society’s expectations of women. Thus, the 
State’s adherence to shari‘a in personal status law is not a form of religiosity as 
much as it is a tool to maintain speciic norms and protect men’s gains. 
Secular feminists argue that selective emphasis on Islamic law was only used 
with regard to women’s rights, and was barely used at all with regard to eco-
nomic policies, for example. This selective emphasis also treated women’s 
3. El_Sadda, 2014, p. 4, 6, 7.
4. Bier, 2011, p. 7.
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struggles in the region as totally isolated from the broader globalized context 
and other social struggles. 
However, what distinguished the Nasserite era is what Mervat Hatem calls 
“State feminism,” 5 by which the State monopolized discourse in the name of 
women and their rights. This had a great inluence on the feminist movement 
which had previously materialized in civil society organizations and publish-
ing projects only; with this containment attempt, other feminist voices were 
mufled and the State’s voice alone dominated the scene. The shrinking public 
space for women in terms of organization and freedom of expression was part 
of the shrinking political space on all levels, with the abolition of political 
parties and crackdown on political dissent. We must bear in mind that despite 
the autocratic regime, the strong Nasserist State delivered tangible changes in 
women’s lives, especially in education and employment. 
This was mirrored both on the levels of the State and of society. It was not 
just the valorization and the prioritization of female reproductive roles and 
home chores. More importantly, this tendency to domesticate women was 
gradually constituted by State discourse, in which it appeared through the 
years, under different political regimes. In the 1971 Constitution, article 11 
stressed the State’s responsibility to advance women’s role in public life in a 
manner that would allow them to keep a balance between their public 
engagement and domestic responsibilities. This is an acknowledgement by 
the State that women are domestic individuals, and that housework and rais-
ing children are solely women’s responsibility. Furthermore, it suggests that 
women’s presence in the public sphere is an exceptional state, which must be 
excused and justiied. 
CHANGES IN CONDITIONS FOR WOMEN AND THE NGOS’ STRUGGLES
Intriguingly, that constitutional article survived all subsequent constitutional 
amendments and found its way into the new Constitutions that have been 
articulated since then. This just might reassure us on how the State is dealing 
with the question of women.
What happened when the State let go of the issue? Who then ended up 
owning public space?
Modernization efforts were translated into high rates of female school 
enrollment in Egypt. Women made signiicant strides forward, speciically in 
higher education and university degrees, but all of this could be understood 
through the State’s strong grip on society. Once these institutional guarantees 
for women’s participation faded away and the State’s grip loosened, a sudden 
decrease in female participation in the labor force was noticeable. This is also 
5. Hatem, 1992, p. 231.
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partially attributed to the retreat of the public sector starting in the 1970s and 
to intense waves of privatization during the 1990s. The private sector has usu-
ally been more reluctant to recruit women because private employers think 
recruiting women is a threat to productivity, since women take maternity 
leave and childcare-related leave. So in other words, women’s reproductive 
role is a disincentive to hiring them in the private sector. In addition, young 
women, and speciically those from lower social classes, prefer to work in the 
public sector even if those jobs are not easily attainable or the contracts are 
temporary. As Ghada Barsoum found in her ethnographic ieldwork on female 
labor participation during the irst decade of the new Millennium, women 
prefer government posts since they provide much better maternity care system 
and relatively better work conditions. This compares favorably to the private 
sector, in which women suffer from unequal pay, excessive workloads and 
long working hours, not to mention the constant threat of sexual harassment 
in the workplace which is much more widespread in the private sector. 6 
Moreover, the Demographic and Health Survey suggests that after marriage, 
women are pressured to have children early: 39% of women who have ever 
been married think it is appropriate to use a family planning method after 
having their irst child, while only 2% believe it is appropriate for women to 
use contraception before their irst pregnancy. 7 This pressure to have a irst 
child right after marriage deinitely affects women’s opportunities in the labor 
market and hinders them in the accumulation of work experience, compared 
to their male counterparts.
On the political level, the State has always reserved all cabinet posts, and 
positions of power – such as that of governor – for men. An insigniicant num-
ber of women have been appointed at high levels, always to speciic ministerial 
portfolios, to the extent that ministries such as the Ministry of State for 
Environmental Affairs or the Ministry of Social Solidarity are relatively femi-
nized. No woman was ever appointed to a key ministerial position in Foreign 
Affairs, the Interior, Defense and Finance. Even in the early days after the 
January 2011 revolution, the new draft Constitution initially only recognized 
men’s right to run for President. This was later changed in the formal draft put 
to a referendum in March 2011, to allow both men and women to run. 
This male monopoly on higher positions is orchestrated by the State, but 
also embraced and praised by the general public. On March 8, 2011, feminist 
organizations and individuals organized a march from the Press Syndicate to 
Tahrir Square on International Women’s Day. I attended this march; the focus 
was mostly on the demand for prioritizing women’s rights after the revolution 
and for gender equality, speciically after women’s massive participation in 
the uprising. As the march reached Tahrir Square, groups of men started to 
6. Barsoum, 2010, p. 78, 79.
7. EDHS, 2008, p. 68, 69.
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attack the men and women in the march claiming that they were devilish 
women supported by gay men, that women do not have the right to run for 
President, and they should stay at home and stick to their jobs as mothers and 
housewives. These men even kept pointing to a fully veiled woman, saying 
she is the model of the Egyptian woman; she is the igure of the martyr’s 
mother. So to these men, the only role allowed for women in this revolution is 
to be mothers; martyrdom is for men. 
With the development of the Egyptian State, the feminist movement has 
also evolved toward a state of NGO-ization. The term, coined by Islah Jad, 8 
denotes the huge tendency within the movement to form NGOs during the 
1980s and 1990s, and how became the dominant trend, instead of it being a 
grassroots movement, connected to people as a social movement should be. 
Jad criticized these NGOs for isolating women’s issues in women’s organiza-
tions and, thus doing, decontextualizing women’s rights from the bigger 
picture of the struggle, leading to what he described as a failure to mobilize or 
organize and to the limitation of activities to advocacy or education. One 
might agree with some of Jad’s critique, especially the temporality of some 
NGOs’ projects, but it should not be generalized. Moreover, we should not 
discredit women’s and feminist NGOs or consider their roles were minor just 
because they were functioning under authoritarian regimes. 
In Egypt speciically, feminist and women’s NGOs managed to address 
many sensitive issues that had remained out of reach until then. It was the 
women’s rights and feminist organizations who irst engaged with problems 
occurring in the private sphere. The long-term struggles of NGOs played a 
pivotal role in changing the personal status law in 2000 to include khol’a, 
winning women the right to initiate a divorce if they return their dowries, 
wedding gifts and give up all material claims on their husbands. 9 And all this 
happened when the political scene was very weak under Mubarak’s authori-
tarian rule and the state of emergency. It is a debatable gain, but it deinitely is 
a gain – and in a very thorny area. 
The battle for the criminalization of female circumcision is another exam-
ple of the successes of NGOs. In 2004, NGOs won another battle for the 
amendment of the nationality law. The law was changed to allow Egyptian 
women who are married to non-Egyptians, to transmit their nationality to their 
children. 10 After years of ighting embedded norms and being accused of 
adopting a Western agenda, and being spies and agents of the West, these 
NGOs managed to force the Egyptian government to amend the law to crimi-
nalize female circumcision in 2008. NGOs like the New Woman Foundation 
and El-Nadim were among the irst to discuss issues of domestic violence, 
incest and marital rape. Speciically, these two organizations were among the 
8. Jad, 2004.
9. Al Awan, 2008.
10. SIS, 2013.
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irst to conduct studies on this overlooked issue. Moreover, El-Nadim pro-
vided access to shelters, psychological support and rehabilitation for survivors 
of domestic violence. A few years ago, El-Nadim proposed a comprehensive 
draft law to combat domestic violence from a feminist and rights-based 
approach. Unfortunately, the text never made its way through Parliament to 
become law. 11
THE EXTENSION OF VIOLENCE FROM THE PRIVATE SPHERE  
TO THE PUBLIC SPHERE
In the years preceding the January 25, 2011 uprising, levels of violence 
against women in the public sphere increased exponentially. This phenome-
non was irst detected during the Eid festivities in 2005 and 2006. Groups of 
young men were seen encircling young girls and women in the street, and 
starting to forcefully strip them, grope their genitalia, and sexually harass and 
assault them. This was very soon after the May 25, 2005 State attacks on 
female political dissidents protesting against constitutional amendments 
during the Mubarak era. That day, the authorities hired thugs to attack and 
sexually assault female protesters. Many incidents of collective and State-
sponsored violence have occurred since then. The severity of these attacks 
and incidents has further intensiied since the January 25, 2011 uprising; 
female protesters have repeatedly been subjected to a barbaric form of mob 
sexual assaults by groups of men, which have reached the extent of knife 
rapes. 12 Another signiicant development is the practice of so-called “virginity 
testing,” in which the army subjected a number of women who had been 
arrested during the forcible dispersal of a March 2011 sit-in in Tahrir Square, 
to forced virginity tests. To defend this action and justify these procedures, an 
army oficer declared to CNN that “The girls who were detained were not like 
your daughter or mine. These were girls who had camped out in tents with 
male protesters in Tahrir Square.” 13 The mere presence of these women in the 
street was reason enough to cast doubt upon their morality. Similar discourse 
was used during the Ultras (organized football fans) sit-in protest of April 
2012, in the vicinity of the Cabinet building: the football fans rejected the 
presence of women in the sit-in at night, saying it would make it easier for the 
media to defame the whole struggle, alleging boys and girls were spending 
the night together in tents, having sexual intercourse.
11. El-Nadim’s draft law on domestic violence is available here: http://alnadeem.org/
iles/draft_law_violence_against_women_ar.pdf.




Social scientists and gender specialists have long contemplated the root 
causes of these social ills. The next section will review some of the reasons 
they have considered.
Domestication of Public Space
This is based on the assumption that in States like Egypt where the State is not 
able to penetrate or alter social norms or power dynamics in society, 14 norms 
of the private sphere spontaneously make their way to the public sphere, so 
the same power relationships are transferred to it, even though the lived reali-
ties in the public sphere may be otherwise. 15 Describing Egypt as a “weak 
state” does not nullify the authoritarian character of the ruling regime. This 
domestication allows men of whatever age or class to sexually harass women 
even if they look wealthier, more educated, or better-connected than them. 
This phenomenon of domestication might also explain a very common scene 
on Egyptian streets: that of a man beating a woman in broad daylight, with no 
apparent reason, and if anyone wishes to intervene, people prevent them from 
doing so by saying the woman is the attacker’s wife. This translates to him hav-
ing the right to discipline her physically. 
The explanation from the ield of gender studies also resonates with Asef 
Bayat’s explanation of the transformation of the public sphere in cities like 
Cairo, Tehran, Jakarta and others. In these neo-liberal cities, people extend 
their private lives to the urban street. 16 Asef Bayat has primarily focused on 
persons who are outside institutional umbrellas like housewives, street vendors 
and street children. Yet his analysis in terms of cities being turned inside out, 
could inspire us to relect more about the consequences of this domestication 
of the public sphere – in other words, how the values of the private sphere are 
exported to the street, so the city becomes a home and citizenship is dissolved, 
while the superiority of men is maintained, as it is within the family. 
Salwa Ismail cites failed hegemonic masculinity 17 as a reason for low-
er-class men’s persistent view of women as inferior, as well as their patrolling 
of women and denial of any public role to them. Salwa Ismail captures feel-
ings such as the frustrations men experience in Egypt due to their inability to 
play the role of sole breadwinner, and their crushing sense of inferiority to 
police oficers, in what she calls “injured masculinity”. 18 The concepts Ismail 
uses to interpret lower-class men’s perceptions of women and their value are 
not limited to this class, since many of these perceptions prevail across 
classes. This does not mean dismissal of class as a category of analysis; it is an 
14. Zaki & Abd El-Hameed, 2014.
15. Scott & Keates, 2004.
16. Bayat, 2013, p. 13.
17. Hegemonic masculinity is the concept of male dominance and women’s subordina-
tion, based on the male breadwinner role and the female reproductive and sexual role. 
18. Ismail, 2006, p. 96, 97, 108, 109, 120.
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attempt to understand men’s perceptions of women’s entitlements in Egypt, 
especially now that media outlets tend to spread reductionist discourses justi-
fying violence against women and disbelief in gender equality by presenting 
them as endemic to the lower classes. Ismail’s contention might invite us to 
adopt a broader apprehension of hegemonic masculinity in Egypt, not limited 
to a speciic class but actually transmitted to others, leading to the prevalence 
of the notion that women are not entitled to pursue a career or earn a living, 
even when they still earn less than their male partners. 
This historical review reafirms the fact that women do not own public 
space in Egypt, and more importantly, that this mirrors the power dynamics in 
the private sphere. Women do have the right to go to school, to work, to run 
errands but they are not widely recognized as having the right to occupy street 
corners as men do. Hence, women’s presence in public space places them in 
a state of exceptionality which always has to be justiied: “I am going to 
school,” “I am picking up my children,” “I am doing the grocery shopping,” 
etc. Women do not have the “right to loiter,” as Indian scholars put it. 19
 Some believe the unprecedented levels of violence against women during 
the Egyptian revolution have been an expected backlash to the unprecedented 
participation of women in the public sphere. Yet more importantly, the revolu-
tion also represented a unique moment in the struggle for women’s rights. 
First of all, we should view women’s right to participate in shaping the future 
of their country through protests, strikes and the uprising as the most precious 
political right since it is related to grassroots activism and not merely some-
thing bestowed upon them by the State, that could easily be demolished. 
Women have also organized themselves, along with groups of men, to resist 
the sexual violence they face in the public space. The emergence of these 
groups has been the real manifestation of the revolution within the domain of 
women’s rights. These groups have tried to replace the absent security forces 
by volunteering to get women out of the “circles of hell” of mob sexual 
assault. Many of them have also engaged in awareness-raising activities and 
worked on sexual violence in other sites like the subway, schools or universi-
ties. Their groundbreaking work, along with the long struggle of women’s 
rights NGOs, has helped articulate a revolutionary discourse that contributed 
to ending the long-standing practice of denial on the part of both the State 
and society, especially concerning sexual violence issues. 
Their work has also been relatively helpful in invalidating the prevailing 
habit of blaming victims of sexual violence, since many survivors of these 
attacks have talked to the media shamelessly, expressing the idea that it is per-
petrators who should be ashamed, not survivors. Moreover, these struggles 
have facilitated the realization of a long-awaited change in the laws related to 
19. Rande, Khan & Phadke, 2009.
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sexual violence. The modiication of this legal framework is partial, yet it has 
been celebrated as a step forward and an example of bottom-up change. 
In the aftermath of the June 30, 2013 events, militarization and the shrink-
ing of public space for activism have limited the ability of these groups to 
lourish and form a nucleus for a real grassroots movement. This has also 
restricted their potential for revolutionizing the feminist consciousness.
Nevertheless, there have been gains that are dificult to roll back. Most 
importantly, the activism of women’s rights groups and collectives resisting 
sexual violence has imposed a minimum level of political correctness on the 
mobilized critical mass who have participated actively in the revolution, and 
who are still active in social media circles. This critical mass would now criti-
cize any reactionary discourse regarding women that may appear in the 
media or in any other institutions. In other words, they now play the role of a 
pressure group responsible for adjusting discourse, a role that had always 
been played, less successfully, by feminist and women’s rights NGOs in the 
past. This change was evidenced in the public denunciation of a statement by 
Cairo University President Gaber Nassar. Following a mob sexual harassment 
incident on the university campus in March 2014, Nassar announced the uni-
versity would investigate the incident and punish those who were found to be 
in the wrong, whether it was the girl or the perpetrators. Angry reactions to 
this statement from broad circles of activists and different groups obliged the 
University President to apologize for presenting the victim as possibly respon-
sible for her assault. Similar incidents have echoed this example, conirming 
there has been a paradigm shift in the gender consciousness of the broader 
revolutionary groups. 
CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of feminist struggle in Egypt, issues pertaining to the 
private sphere remained relatively deprioritized, while the battles for other 
rights were dominant instead; this has been the case from the right to vote to 
the recent battles against sexual violence against women in the public sphere. 
Even when women’s issues within the private sphere have been picked up, the 
struggles over them have been much harder and the victories smaller and less 
effective. One example of this is the ight to criminalize female circumcision 
and the attempts to criminalize domestic violence. 
The priority in the next phase should be further sensitizing this critical mass 
to gender and women’s issues, especially regarding their value systems related 
to the private sphere. The young men and women in this critical mass might 
not adopt a fully progressive perception of women’s rights, but at least they are 
willing to question their convictions. Deeply-rooted gender stereotypes, espe-
cially those related to the private sphere, need to be shaken if we are to pursue 
a real change in women’s conditions of life in Egypt. Meaningful progress in 
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this regard and the achievement of substantive equality will entail moving 
beyond the conditional rights to education and to work, to a more compre-
hensive, deeper belief in all of women’s rights, and ending the conditionality 
according to which women may work only if they have already succeeded as 
housewives. The problem with this “cult of domesticity” is that it is used to 
discredit women’s professional and political entitlements by only valorizing 
their domestic and reproductive role. Enhancing gender equality in the public 
sphere cannot be achieved without tackling inequality rooted in the private 
sphere, so that we will no longer turn on the radio on any given day and ind a 
debate on women’s right to work and how this would affect them as mothers 
and their relationships with their husbands as the sole breadwinners. 
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